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Between Literature and Science: Inscribing Zora Neale 
Hurston’s Mules and Men in the Post-human Condition 
 
Jung-Hsien Lin 
Claremont Graduate University 




Intrigued by the influence of technology on or in literature as well as the ways of which the 
posthuman body subverts the existing social constructs of race, gender, and culture, this paper 
appropriates the Foucauldian concept of “technologies of the self” to investigate the narrating 
“I/eye” in Zora Neale Hurston’s Mules and Men.  I flesh out how Hurston’s new “cyborg” 
identity, along with the idea of performativity—particularly in relation to her manipulation of the 
genre of autoethnography—resists the dominant constructs of race, gender and culture.  
Through a re-examination of these major moments of transformations of knowledge/power in 
Hurston’s Mules and Men through the lens of cyborg feminism, my ultimate goal is to offer a 
new connection between science and literature. 
 
 
When Zora Neale Hurston introduces her 1935 autoethnographical work Mules and Men to her 
readers, she immediately calls our attention to the gap between the old Zora and the new Zora:  
 
When I pitched headforemost into the world I landed in the crib of negroism.  From the 
earliest rocking of my cradle, I had known about the capers Brer Rabbit is apt to cut and 
what the Squinch Owl says from the house top.  But it was fitting me like a tight chemise.  
I couldn’t see it for wearing it.  It was only when I was off in college, away from my 
native surroundings, that I could see myself like somebody else and stand off and look at 
my garment.  Then I had to have the spy-glass of Anthropology to look through at that 
(Hurston 3). 
 
Here Hurston emphasizes the difference between her naïve internalization of the African 
American folklore cultures in her childhood and her scientific approach to them after her college 
education.  “The spy-glass of Anthropology [looking] through” implies that, far from being a 
passive transcriber of the Black folklores, Hurston has to recollect the “garment” that she has 
thrown away in order to see what she used to cover herself.  Mules and Men unobtrusively 
functions as a vehicle of Hurston’s own anthropological theory.  When gazing upon those fabrics 
of “big old lies,” what Hurston sees is no laughing matter—they are of power struggles, 
wrestling forces, and survival strategies used by her own people in her own times in order to live.  
A “life” is abbreviated into a “lie.” 
The narrating Zora, however, is not simply an outsider looking in.  What complicates her 
role in her auto/ethnography is her being an outsider from the inside, attempting to be an insider 
again.  What separates her from other true insiders is the “spy-glass” of many new technologies 
registered on her body.  My primary concern is the influence of technology on or in literature and 
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how the very concept of “technologies of the body” challenges or even further subverts the 
existing social constructs of race, gender, and culture.  I argue that the Foucauldian concept of 
“technologies of the self”—the spy-glass—transforms the narrating “I/eye” of Zora in the Mules 
and Men into a “cyborg” and demonstrates how her new “cyborg” identity, along with the idea 
of performativity, resists the dominant constructs of race, gender and culture.  By juxtaposing “I” 
and “eye” against each other, I mean to highlight Hurston’s calculated appropriation of a 
narrating persona (Zora) in the auto/ethnographic work Mules and Men and describes the ways in 
which the “I/eye” occupies simultaneously subject and object position as narratives unfold.  
Namely, the “I” who participates actively in the target-culture, the overt object of the gaze in a 
Lacanian sense, is also the uncanny “eye” that observes the culture voyeuristically, be(com)ing 
the covert gazing subject.  
 
Explanation of Methodology: Cyborg Feminism 
 
     Before we inspect the cyborg identity of Zora in Mules and Men, two major questions call for 
immediate explications: what constitutes a cyborg and what are its political stakes?  Donna 
Haraway offers a comprehensive definition of cyborg in “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, 
Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century”: 
 
A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social 
reality as well as a creature of fiction.  Social reality is lived social relations, our most 
important political construction, a world-changing fiction.  […]  Liberation rests on the 
construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension, of oppression, and so of 
possibility.  The cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience that changes what 
counts as women’s experience […].  This is a struggle over life and death, but the 
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion (149). 
 
If we take “social reality” for science and “fiction” for literature, then the fundamental concept of 
cyborg being a mixture of social reality and fiction parallels the rise of sociology, a disciplinary 
hybrid sprung from the liminal space between science and fiction.  Liberation lies precisely in 
the hybridity of cyborg, as Haraway argues “for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries” (150).  
If the “Cyborg Manifesto” celebrates the disruption accompanying modern technology of 
stereotypically considered as fixed boundaries between “life” (social reality/organism) and “lies” 
(fiction/machine), my goal is to demonstrate how Hurston’s narrator in Mules and Men embodies 
this celebration of deconstruction of the social boundaries.  To expedite new postmodern cyborg 
subjectivity, Haraway encourages revolutions in human conception of the existing binaries (i.e. 
race, gender, and class), upon which modernist notions of subjectivity rely.  Intrigued by 
Haraway and her cyborg theory, I trace the trajectory of how Hurston’s new cyborg subjectivity 
undermines these social dichotomies in Mules and Men.  In traversing freely the boundaries 
between various systems, a new cyborg identity/subjectivity embraces liberation from the 
dominant structures of race, gender and power.   
Deviating from Haraway, recent scholars have otherwise devoted their attention to the 
intersection of social reality and fictional events from another direction—sociology.  Wolf 
Lepenies warns us in Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology of the danger 
behind the vicious competition between literature and science.  He shows how this partition is 
not only arbitrary but detrimental and argues that the social sciences should be granted their own 
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epistemic space (Lepenies 1-15).  It is through the use of language that the two intersects for 
language is the quintessential fabric in constructing any cultural and societal discourse.  Hurston 
acknowledges the vital role of language in recollecting African American folklores, songs and 
Black southern cultures.  As Lucy Anne Hurston points out in “Zora Neale Hurston: Pioneering 
Social Scientist,” (Zora Neale) Hurston as well as other “[s]ocial scientists believe that language 
is the most important element of culture in that it facilitates the sharing of the interpretation of 
abstract concepts among its members.  This communication, in turn, functions to create the 
reality of the group” (18-19) and “distinguishes humans from all other species and is the 
foundation of every cultural group” (19).   In this light, the folklore collections in Mules and Men 
exemplify Hurston’s beliefs and methods of ethnography—the writings of cultures.  
In line with Lepenies’ concerns, Susan Mizruchi illustrates how a sociological reading of 
the employment of type-casting in representative American literary works from different 
historical moments assists our understating of society as a whole.   These “types” in literature 
mirror not only the ideological and political condition of their own time, but furthermore, they 
reciprocally reinforce or mold the hierarchical power networks concerning the types being 
portrayed.  W. E. B. Du Bois terms sociology as “the science that seeks to measure the limits of 
chance in human action, or if you will excuse the paradox, it is the science of free will” 
(Wortham 32, 391).  However, the idea of society, knowledge, or subjectivity as integrated 
entities has become fiercely contested with the rise of modern technology in the age of 
computerization.  If the limits of chance in human action become more extensive, what may 
become of the dimension of free will?  New types in both literature and society must arise in 
response to this change in the postindustrial and post-cybernetic era.  In Haraway’s framework, 
the emergence of the cyborg is one perfect model among these new types in both reality and 
fiction.  
 
Reinventing “Technologies of the Self” 
 
If we push the concept of technologies to a metaphysical level, meaning, if we interpret 
the idea of technologies in terms of gadgets of human mind or soul, then we reach an argument 
that Foucault had proposed in his short essay “Technologies of the Self.”  In “Technologies of 
the Self” (as well as “The Political Technology of Individuals”), the new theoretical direction 
towards which Foucault leaned shortly before his death in 1984, Foucault transitions from his 
earlier discussion of power and its relation to knowledge to the ethical aspects of the networks of 
knowledge, among which the “self” or the subject(ivity) is formed.  He suggests that 
“technologies of the self  […] permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way 
of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immorality” (18).  Tracing the historiography of technologies of the self, 
Foucault defines two crucial ancient historical practices from Greek tradition: first, the Delphic 
principle, “Know Yourself”; second, “Take Care of Yourself” (19).  To do so, one has to find or 
locate the self.  Ironically, the self is found behind the principle “not of the body but of the soul” 
(25), which, in turn, transitions the care for the body into the care of the soul, from a physical 
level to an ethical level.  Accordingly, when Hurston deliberately puts on the spy-glass to see 
through her own garment—her own culture, her own color—she was following the practice of 
“knowing oneself.”  In volunteering for a firsthand experience of the Southern voodoo/hoodoo 
practices for her ethnographic research, Zora also experiments with means of “taking care of 
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herself.”  Both techniques are Hurston’s new technologies of the self.  These tools validate her 
subjectivity of cyborg, the source for her subversive power. 
Another element that is also under the influence of “technologies of the self” is 
knowledge.  Jean-Francois Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
investigates how the status and production of knowledge as well as its materiality have mutated 
in a postindustrial or “postmodern” society.  Knowledge itself has undergone significant 
transformations as “it ceases to be an end in itself” (5).  The age of computerization has opened 
up the gate of knowledge and/or information, and this accessibility to knowledge fosters the 
issues of legitimation of information.  Katherine N. Hayles in How We Become Posthuman 
proposes a more “updated” version of Lyotard’s argument, confirming that not only knowledge, 
but the human body per se initiates its own process of disembodiment (25-49).  Influenced by 
how knowledge is produced in the techno-age, our body gradually loses its own unifying 
materiality.  The digital information, contrarily, finds its own materiality through its influences 
on the human subjects.  This posthuman subject is “an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous 
components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction 
and reconstruction” (Hayles 3).  Hayles argues that we have arrived at a posthuman condition, in 
which no individual could remain intact, as a consolidated, unifying subject, but rather, a 
collective, mosaic database.   In other words, the subject of human is deconstructed and 
reconstructed into “after-human,” or cyborg.   
 
The Doubling of the “I” and the “Eye” in Hurston’s Mules and Men 
 
     The most cited paragraph from Du Bois’ famous piece The Souls of Black Folk resonates with 
both Hayles’ argument of “human as database” and Hurston’s “spy-glass” from another 
dimension:  
 
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the 
Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this 
American World,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him 
see himself through the revelation of the other world.  It is a peculiar sensation, this 
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, 
of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity 
(Wortham 72, emphasis mine). 
 
However, different from Hurston’s garment, Du Bois’ veil represents a more “compulsory 
ignorance” for the American society in its entity, covering folks from two sides of the color lines 
(Wortham 74).  The veil combines both the garment and the “feather-bed resistance” (4) in 
Hurston’s construction.  Though Du Bois’ “second-sight” parallels Hurston’s “spy-glass” (3), 
Hurston does not identify with the same dilemma that Du Bois poses.  The sense of “always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others” is in alignment with Hurston’s statement of “that 
I could see myself like somebody else and stand off and look at my garment” (3).  Nevertheless, 
both the double-consciousness of Du Bois and the spy-glass of Hurston involve a “two-ness” or 
“two unreconciled strivings” (Wortham 72), or a gap, a split in consciousness.  In a Lacanian or 
psychoanalytical sense, this is the moment in which subjectivity forms. The two-ness that 
remains unreconciled for Du Bois is never meant to be reconciled for Hurston.  From a 
Haylesian or posthuman angle, this “two-ness” within a single body marks the moment in which 
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one ceases being human, rather, transforming into a post-human.  Hurston, or the Zora in Mules 
and Men, functioning with her own version of the double-consciousness, as a collective self-
hood, a cumulative database, reaffirms her cyborg identity in both social reality and fiction.  
However, half a century before Haraway’s manifesto of how cyborg helps to break down 
the boundary between human bodies and objects, and how cyborg feminism should bridge the 
gap between socialism and feminism, Hurston in 1935 had already been leading her life as a 
psychological cyborg, tackling the issues of race and gender in her time.  Throughout her 
lifetime, Hurston constantly “re-wrote” her past and present in order to invent her future.  This 
very practice of manipulating “lies” to reconstruct her subjectivity and identity makes Hurston a 
self-made (wo)man, and this “manipulation of technology” makes her post-human.  As shown in 
Mules and Men, the idea of “returning to the past from the future” is constant and intentional.  
First, this return makes it possible for the narrating “I/eye,” through her new cyborg identity, to 
reconstruct her social status related to her past.  Second, it justifies Hurston’s choice of site for 
her ethnographic studies to be her hometown.  If she had wished to distance herself from the 
subjects of her studies, she would have chosen unfamiliar places for her ethnography.  By 
returning to her “birthplace,” Hurston is returning to her past to modify her present identity, 
which again echoes her technologies of the self—a major part of her cyborg identity. 
Before moving on to Mules and Men and the textual cyborg, we should understand the 
cyborg elements in Hurston’s biographical events, for they illuminate our understanding of her 
cyborg identity in the novel.  To begin with, Eatonville, Florida is not where Hurston was born.  
Hurston was born in Notasulga, Alabama.  However, as Valerie Boyd points out in her biography 
of Hurston, Wrapped in Rainbows, Hurston believed her life began the moment she received her 
education in Eatonville: “For Zora Hurston, Eatonville was always home.  Throughout her life, 
she would claim Eatonville as her birthplace and refer to it as her ‘native village.’  […]  In any 
case, she never mentioned Notasulga as part of her personal geography” (25).  In claiming 
Eatonville as her “birthplace,” Hurston utilizes narratives, or language, to reconstruct her concept 
of self.  Moreover, she constructs her authority and credibility in Mules and Men.  Another 
example of Hurston’s “lie as life” or “narratives as performances” is how often she modified her 
age.  When Hurston was twenty-six, she modified her birth year from 1891 to 1901 in order to be 
eligible for a free high-school education in Baltimore, which she had been denied in the South 
(Boyd 73-75). This shows how freely Hurston revised her personal history and how she 
constructed her identity through “lies” or pure narratives—“In a quiet act of revolution, in a city 
where few people knew her history, [Hurston] decided to subvert the rules” (75).  In Hurston’s 
“herstory,” the self is always “post-human,” for it is always the “after-me” instead of “not-me.”  
This idea of “not me” signifies the core of cyborg identity, which consists of a constantly 
changing, ever-fluid subjectivity that is always under the influence of new technologies.   
Away from her biographical events, in Mules and Men, we see how Hurston, through the 
approach of the participant-observer, materializes the cultural investigations of the field 
anthropologist as she took part in performative events studied in context of the customs and 
social lives of the groups in their natural environments.  The “lies” Hurston endeavors to compile 
are culturally significant, especially as they create, reciprocally, the social reality of the Southern 
Black folks.  As L. Hurston’s observes,  
 
The folklore Hurston collected was a natural database of demographic information 
yielding insights relevant to gender, class, family, age, status, employment, and other 
indices.  […]  Embedded in these recordings is Hurston’s process of capturing and 
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presenting oral expressions, significantly highlighting Hurston’s ability to meld the 
worlds of science and art (18).   
 
Hurston’s works contribute to our understanding of the social life of the Southern Black 
population from an insider’s perspective.  Her own childhood experience in Eatonville, Florida, 
and her later journey to the South made her an expert of Black culture.  As an insider, Hurston is 
better positioned to transcribe and to interpret Black culture.  On the other hand, Hurston plays 
the role of commanding the scientific and popular definitions of Black folk culture rather than 
uncritically allowing “outsiders” to define her own culture.  Furthermore, she “transculturates”  
those definitions of her native marginal insider-groups on the outsider-groups while 
simultaneously transmitting them to the larger, dominant society.  Hurston’s ethnographic works 
become the contact zone between the Black and White cultural groups.  However, as I mentioned 
earlier, Hurston is also an outsider looking in.  Therefore, in order to secure an insider’s 
perspective, in order to guard her authenticity and authority in her representations of the Black 
folk-cultures, Hurston has to strive for the access to a community that was once of her own.  This 
defines her intentionality behind the adoption of a narrating “I/eye” to assist her in the 
exploration of “lies.”  As Hurston herself points out:  
 
Folklore is not as easy to collect as it sounds.  The best source is where there are the least 
outside influences, and these people, being usually underprivileged, are the shyest.  They 
are most reluctant at times to reveal that which the soul lives by.  And the Negro, in spite 
of his open-faced laughter, his seeming acquiescence, is particularly evasive.  You see we 
are a polite people, and we do not say to our questioner, “Get out of here!”  We smile and 
tell him or her something that satisfies the white person because, knowing so little about 
us, he doesn’t know what he is missing.  The Indian resists curiosity by a stony silence.  
The Negro offers a feather bed resistance, that is, we let the probe enter, but it never comes 
out.  It gets smothered under a lot of laughter and pleasantries (4). 
 
Hurston is aware of the possibility of being treated with “a feather bed resistance” (which she 
was) by her childhood community, and this awareness is also an awareness of a different sense 
of self and subjectivity.  However, by pointing out the resistance among the Black folks against 
outsiders, Hurston also mocks the authority and credibility of previous White scholars who have 
attempted to delve into the mind of the Southern Black folks.  Moreover, this paragraph indicates 
Hurston’s awareness of her own “spy-glass of Anthropology”; namely, she is conscious of her 
acquired technologies of the self, her new cyborg identity.   
To better illustrate what constitutes the narrating “I/eye” in Mules and Men as cyborg, we 
need to pin point the major elements of “technologies” inscribed on Zora’s body in the novel: 
first, Zora with her Chevy; second, her advanced education from Bernard College; third, the 
newly acquired voodoo/hoodoo practices.  The narrating Zora hints at the new technologies she 
carries several times in the book; for instance, “I realized that I was new myself” and “I didn’t go 
back there so that the home folks could make admiration over me because I had been up North to 
college and come back with a diploma and a Chevrolet” (3).   In the 1930s, it was uncommon for 
a woman, let alone an African American woman, to drive or even possess a car.  Hurston herself 
repeats many times the description of her with her Chevy in Mules and Men: “I began to feel 
eager to be there and I kicked the little Chevrolet right along” (5), “everybody crowded around 
my car to help greet me” (9), “the little Chevrolet” (20, 64) or “shiny gray Chevrolet” (65).  She 
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even has to contrive a clever plot to keep her car with her at all times while collecting folktales 
without looking suspicious, such as the scenario from the Polk County ball, in which Zora lies 
about being a bootlegger (64-66).  Thus “driving back” to Eatonville and Zora being unable to 
function without her Chevy alters her physically into a cyborg.  By appropriating Foucault’s 
notion of “technologies of the self,” we see that Hurston’s college education, particularly her 
training in anthropology—the spy-glass she wears for observing her native folks—programs the 
way in which Hurston perceive the world.  An African American female from the south who 
received higher education in New York (having experienced the Harlem Renaissance) is another 
extraordinary phenomenon, and the power/knowledge as well as the rich cultural capital 
reinvents Hurston mentally into a cyborg.  In Part Two, Hurston’s pursuit of the voodoo/hoodoo 
practices—what the Black folks worship and what the white people fear—upgrades herself, 
symbolically, into a cyborg.   
 
Performing Lies as the Performative Life in Hurston’s Auto/Ethnography 
 
     In deliberately choosing the genre of auto/ethnography, Hurston strategically deconstructs and 
reconstructs the subjectivity of the narrating “I/eye.”  It is possible to Hurston shift the 
conventional ground of ethnographic studies through the way in which she presents the self by 
participating in, and subsequently recording, the “lies.”  This preoccupation with self, with the 
observing “eye” and the performing “I,” in the discourse outside the narrative acts, is a 
problematic element in Hurston’s ethnographic work.  Hurston makes her narrative device 
performative by adopting a narrative “I/eye” in her ethnographic accounts.  This performativity 
of narration distinguishes the “I-at-the-moment (of speaking)” from the “I-in-the-past (of being 
spoken).”  In the process of narration, Hurston performs her subjectivity while concurrently 
subverting it.  Returning to Lyotard and his comments on the legitimation of knowledge in the 
postmodern condition, that “the subject is concrete, or supposedly so, and its epic is the story of 
its emancipation from everything that prevents it from governing itself” (35), when applied to 
Mules and Men, the epic of Zora’s narrative is her own liberation from everything that prevents 
her from her technologies of self, from her identity of cyborg.  Lyotard suggests that the 
emancipation comes from the narrative game (27-31), and that “knowledge finds its validity not 
within itself, not in a subject that develops by actualizing its learning possibilities, but in a 
practical subject” (35).  Should this be accurate, then by casting a performative “I/eye” in 
recounting an auto/ethnography, Hurston secures a counter-public space for her own subjectivity.   
     Hurston’s incorporation of a narrating “I/eye” in Mules and Men is a self-empowering act, for 
it articulates the desire for the expression of selfhood, which is similar to Hurston’s deliberate 
inclusion of the hoodoo/voodoo practices.  Let us not forget that the genre of Mules and Men is 
“auto/ethnography”—literarily, the writings of (self-)culture, intensifying the cultural 
significance of hoodoo practices.  From a Foucauldian perspective, Hurston’s actual acquisition 
of hoodoo practices is a means of “taking care of her own self,” a technology of the body.  From 
Hurston’s perspective, hoodoo is a religion to the Southern Black folk as Christianity to the 
White folk of the rest of the United States.  In the opening of Part Two of Mules and Men, 
Hurston comments:  
 
Hoodoo, or Voodoo, as pronounced by the whites, is burning with a flame in America, 
with all the intensity of a suppressed religion.  It has its thousands of secret adherents.  It 
adapts itself like Christianity to its locale, reclaiming some of its borrowed characteristics 
7
Lin: Inscribing Hurston’s Mules and Men in the Post-human Condition
Lin 8 
 
to itself.  Such a fire-worship as signified in the Christian church by the alter and the 
candles.  And the belief in the power of water to sanctify as in baptism.   
          Belief in magic is older than writing.  So nobody knows how it started (193).  
 
Here Huston tries to connect hoodoo to Christianity.  Through building up this connection, 
Hurston is able to further elaborate her belief that hoodoo shares the same cultural significance to 
the Southern Black as what Christianity is to the White.  Then Hurston gives a folktale-like 
account of the origin story, connects God, Moss, Queen of Sheba, and Soloman with the 
threshold of the black magic (193-95).  Similar to Christianity, hoodoo is both an answer and a 
question.  Religion is one way to “Know Yourself” according to Foucault’s theory; thus, for 
Hurston, acquiring the hoodoo practices is an introspective act.  It is an act for Hurston to see 
what’s inside the garment.  On the other hand, from the perspective of Clifford Geertz in The 
Interpretation of Cultures, religion is one path for knowing other cultures.  Geertz states that, in 
order to tackle the meanings, we should start from scratch, finding the “sacred symbols 
[functioning] to synthesize a people’s ethos” because they are “the picture they have of the way 
things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order”(89).  Therefore, for 
Hurston, transcribing the voodoo practices becomes simultaneously an extrospective move.   It is 
a step forward for the outsiders to, at least, see the veil itself.  
The power of religion comes from performativity.  We see the concept of performances 
and performativity in Geertz’s definition of religion: “(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) 
establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura 
of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” (90).  From the words 
like “symbols,” “moods,” “conceptions,” to “aura of factuality,” the emphasis is not on the Real, 
or the concrete facts or tangible object; rather, the emphasis is on the invisible and the intangible.  
Performativity and knowledge are what endow religious symbols and rituals legitimate power.  It 
is performativity that legitimates knowledge, as Lyotard suggests in The Postmodern Condition 
under discussion of what constitutes a scientific observation if all senses are deceptive and proofs 
need to be proven (41-44).   He asserts that this is where technology comes into play because:  
 
Technology [follows] a principle, and it is the principle of optimal performance: 
maximizing output (the information or modifications obtained) and minimizing input (the 
energy expended in the process).  Technology is therefore a game pertaining not to the 
true, the just, or the beautiful etc., but to efficiency: a technical “move” is “good” when it 
does better and/or expends less energy than another (44). 
 
Both Lyotard and Geertz highlight the notion of contingency of religion—if we read it as one 
form of technology of the self—and how it associates more with efficiency but not with the Real.  
For Hurston, the hoodoo practices are performances and rituals that convert her into a cyborg and 
empower her.  The hoodoo doctors in Mules and Men are portrayed as God’s tools, executing the 
belated justice (234-36, 240-41).  Different doctors perform different hoodoo rituals, even 
though some of them aim at the same effect, such as casting out an estranged spouse or an enemy 
(213, 218, 227, 233, & 246).  Those performances may vary, but the performativity they carry 
out shares the same weight.  It is exactly the same Black folk who are in dire need of the 
mysterious power of hoodoo practices that create the mysterious power of hoodoo.  The 
performativity of voodoo is what makes Hurston a cyborg.  Zora, in becoming a hoodoo doctor, 
8





embodies a cyborg for being God’s tool and for the “technologies” of the hoodoo practices she 
inscribes on the body.  She is before-god, after-human.  Hurston is in a posthuman condition; her 
body, posthuman.   
Taking the concept of performativity in the construction of subjectivity one step further, 
we arrive at the discourse of gender performativity.  In Mules and Men, gender functions as 
Zora’s avatar.  The employment of gender as avatar dehumanizes Hurston’s subject(ivity) as 
human/ woman, resonating with Judith Butler’s argument of gender as performative.   The notion 
of gender as role-playing or avatar is central to Hurston’s cyborg identity as well as to Butler’s 
theory of gender performativity.  Jerry Aline Flieger in Is Oedipus Online proposes the idea of 
“gender as avatar” when constructing a virtual interlocution between Freud and Deleuze, 
asserting that this interlocution between these two great minds challenges both the conventional 
concept of gender and the notion of human.  As the postmodern world has shifted its 
preoccupation with the “transformative processes of becoming” to the “set properties of being,” 
Flieger argues that Deleuze’s theory of “gender as emergence” not only demonstrates the sense 
of “becoming an identity” (in contrast with the previous perception of identity as fixated) but is 
congruous to the theory of gender performativity (158).  She further connects this view of 
“emergent gender” to Haraway’s concept of posthumanism, especially to the theory of cyborg 
feminism, in which gender is always a style of role-playing (168-69).  The concept of “gender as 
performances” confronts the long-existing belief of gender as a biological attribute and it also 
denotes that gender as a cultural construct. 
In Mules and Men we see how Zora tactfully appropriates her gender and sexuality for 
gaining access to knowledge, such as the scenes of collecting folklores or hoodoo practices.  
Take for instance, in the Polk County ball, when Zora is aware of her own difference and 
implicit exclusion from the locals, she starts to participate in the “woofing”  with a local Black 
male in order to retrieve her agency (68-70).  Instead of “being a female” throughout her 
narratives, Hurston only “becomes a woman” when necessary, given her concern to maintain a 
scientific objectivity.  Butler indicates in Gender Trouble that “the sex/gender distinction and the 
category of sex itself appear to presuppose a generalization of ‘the body’ that preexists the 
acquisition of its sexed significance” (164).  This explains the difficulty that Zora encounters 
when she first appears at the ball—her body is that of a cyborg, which makes her “gender” fluid.  
She has to put on the performance of a female to alter others’ perception of her sex.  This scene 
not only illustrates that gender is performative, but it calls our attention to the problematic 
materiality of gender.  As Butler states: 
 
[A]cts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce 
this on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never 
reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause.  Such acts, gestures, enactments, 
generally construed, are performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they 
otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal 
signs and other discursive means.  That the gendered body is performative suggests that it has 
no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitutes its reality (172). 
 
The gendered body acquired “a gender” through its performances, that is, “what does a woman 
do” is socially and culturally constructed to answer the question of “what is a woman?”  Zora, by 
acting out her gender, such as using female charm over the male hoodoo doctors, illustrates the 
problematic idea of gender.  In showing how gender is mere performance, she subverts the 
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gender construction in those acts per se.  This subversive power of gender performativity proves 
how cyborg identity helps deconstruct certain social norms and confronts us with the two major 
questions: What is normal and what is natural?   
On the other hand, in underscoring the traditional subversive role of the “lies,” Hurston 
recognizes the contingency between African American folktales and Black people’s eternal 
battle of the sexes.  The seemingly anecdotal “lies” about the conflicts between Black males and 
females not only suggest how men use these lies to maintain and perpetrate domination of 
women, but also how the Black women recycle them for striking back at their opponents and for 
usurping that power from their oppressors.  In addition to Butler’s theory of performativity and 
gender subversion, Haraway’s theory of the cyborg is deployed through the gender resistance 
that Hurston records through “the big old lies.”  One example of how “technologies of the self” 
becomes the deus ex machine of the folktale is the tale from Mathilda about “why women always 
take advantage of men” (33-38).  In the story, a man asks God for “mo’ strength than woman” 
(34), and the wish is granted; the woman cannot bear the beatings from the man and seeks advice 
from Devil.  Taking the Devil’s suggestion, the woman requests three major keys from God—
keys to the kitchen, to the bedroom, and to the cradle, and therefore secure “mo’ power in [the 
keys] than all de strength de man kin ever git if [the woman] handle ‘em right” (36).  Through 
this anecdotal folktale, Hurston both interweaves the issues of gender battle with the utilization 
of technology—the keys—and she further demonstrates the performativity of power, and the 
ambiguity between good (God, Adam) and evil (Devil, Eve).  Consistently aware of her own role 
as a social scientist (an ethnographer), Hurston leaves the process of moralization to her reader 
while presenting us truth under the “garment”/cover of lies.  
 
Conclusion: “How It Feels to be Colored Me?” 
 
While Mules and Men is presented as a humorous documentation of African American folklores, 
Hurston meticulously rearranges these “lies” to reveal the intricate exchanges between race and 
gender in the life of the southern Blacks.  Consequently, Hurston subverts the racial confinement 
of her time through her ethnographic documentation of “lies” (or folklores) from her people.  
Mules and Men is dotted with several disturbing “lies” that raise the issues of social (in)justice 
and the “color line” problems.  One brief yet powerful tale is the following one: 
 
And dat put me in de mind of a nigger dat useter do a lot of prayin’ up under ‘simmon tree, 
durin’ slavery time.  He’d go up dere and pray to God and beg Him to kill all de white folks.  
Ole Messa heard about it and so de next day he got hisself a armload of sizeable rocks and 
went up de ‘simmon tree, before de nigger got dere, and when he begin to pray and beg de 
Lawd to kill all de white folks, Ole Messa let one of dese rocks fall on Ole Nigger’s head.  It 
was a heavy rock and knocked de nigger over.  So when he got up he looked up and said: 
“Lawd, I ast you to kill all de white folks, can’t you tell a white man from a nigger? (97) 
 
The rock in the white man’s hand symbolizes power, a tool or political technology for executing 
the law.  Through the exposure of these conflicts between the slave and the slave-holder, 
Hurston’s texts confront the White men’s power.  By exhibiting the ostensible inequality of the 
Black people to her white readers, Hurston, equipped with her technologies of education and 
spy-glass of scientific inquires, is confronting her readers at the same time.  In re-accounting 
these “lies” that consist in the majority of historical power struggles between the Black slaves 
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and the white Massa, and by “improvising” these lies through narration, Hurston (as well as the 
people who participate) indirectly reconstructs their racial identity in these accounts.  The 
recurring patterns in narratives beget certain ideological freedom.  Hurston’s ability to re-present 
these “lies” in black and white, with the aid of printing technology and her education, ties closely 
with her cyborg identity and confirms its subversive power.    
     Continuing from his framework in “Technologies of the Self,” Foucault extends his concept 
of “technologies” to the political dimension in “The Political Technology of Individuals,” in 
which he ends with a reflection on the rise of social sciences.  Foucault reminds us that “the 
emergence of social science cannot […] be isolated from the rise of this new political rationality 
and from this new political technology” because “in the same way that, if man—if we, as living, 
speaking, working beings—become an object for several different sciences, the reason has to be 
sought not in an ideology but in the existence of this political technology which we have formed 
in our societies” (162).  The political technology refers to the technologies of the self, and the 
reason lies not in any integral ideological apparatus, but rather, in the dispersed networks of 
power.  Zora’s role of cyborg in Mules and Men exemplifies this new political rationality, and 
through a study of the formation of this new subjectivity we conduct a painstaking investigation 
into the social fabrication of “what makes a human” in our postmodern as well as posthuman 
condition. 
     As if responding to Foucault’s concern of the political technologies of individual, Lyotard 
concludes his report on postmodern knowledge with contemplation on the knowledge and 
modern subjectivity:  
 
The line is to follow for computerization to take the second of these two paths is, in 
principle, quite simple: give the public free access to the memory and data banks.  
Language games would then be games of perfect information at any given moment.  But 
they would also be non-risk fixating in a position of minimax (sic) equilibrium because it 
had exhausted its stakes.  For the stakes would be knowledge (or information, if you 
will), and the reserve of knowledge—language’s reserve of possible utterances—is 
inexhaustible (67).  
 
Consequently, what Hurston achieves—through her cyborg identity which assists her in 
collecting Black folklores and through bringing to light (as well as to archive) the knowledge or 
information of representations of African American cultures—matches perfectly with Lyotard’s 
solution of “giving the public free access to the memory and data banks” by “giving them with 
the information they usually lack for making knowledge” (67).  Hurston’s identity of cyborg 
bridges literature and science in transmuting the covert to the overt.  By re-examining these 
major moments of transformations of knowledge/power in Hurston’s Mules and Men through the 
lens of cyborg feminism, we see how the auto/ethnographical text provides another connection 
between science and literature, the liminal place in which social sciences arise, and also, the 
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